Thursday, February 26, 2009
4-page Summary
"To advance understanding, we need not discover anything new. We already have a vast store of information at our disposal. But a jumble of disorderly data has little cognitive value. Our problem, often enough, is what to make of what we’ve got. Advancement of understanding then involves finding order in or imposing order on the information at hand. Fiction helps. It highlights patterns, spells out implications, draws distinctions, and identifies possibilities we had not recognized in the welter of information before us."
Rarely if ever does fiction serve as a vehicle for "new information," but it often presents new and interesting insights. One of most striking aspects of fiction, in my opinion, is its ability to make people question what they think they know about human nature. Characters who shouldn't be sympathetic often become objects of sympathy, and the reader is left questioning the idea of moral and ethical distinctions...
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
The Tenability of Examples
"Were they committed to the reality of their referents [idealizations, approximations, thought experiments and other falsifying assumptions], theories deploying such devices would be in sorry shape...that there exists NO IDEAL GAS DOES NOT DISCREDIT THE IDEAL GAS LAW. But that there exists no phlogistan decisively discredits phlogistan theory. The difference is plain. The ideal gas law is a fiction. So its falsity does not tell against it. Since phlogistic laws purport to be factual, their falsity is their undoing" (183).
This is a particularly relevant, interesting and enlightening passage because normative models are in fact false, prima facie, but nevertheless invaluable. Were we to do away with thought experiments and models, for example, the field of economics as we know it would probably cease to function. Philosophy would certainly suffer in the absence of thought-experiments (Rawls' theory of justice would crash and burn) and even chemistry would suffer greatly. I find all of this exceedingly interesting because it's self-evident but rarely acknowledged by the academic disciplines it pertains to (particularly in the hard sciences).
I found Elgin's commentary on fiction less relevant. While it is true that fiction and writing can help open our eyes to aspects of the human experience we might not have noticed before (188-189), works of fiction like Shakespeare's can only do so within the confines of what Shakespeare views as relevant to our understanding of human nature. There is nothing inherent in prose or poetry that offers new insights into human nature; the medium, in and of itself, in my opinion, does not reveal anything that Shakespeare could not tell you in person. What the medium does, instead, is to magnify the effect of Shakespeare's innate wisdom about human nature and help the reader better understand jealousy or lust. Thought experiments and models are different because they may reveal knowledge that we otherwise would not come to. Rawl's veil of ignorance theory, for instance, serves as a method of PRODUCING an insight. Poetry, as a medium, does not PRODUCE insight but instead TRANSMITS it. This is not to denigrate the role of poetry; I myself am a poet. However, I do not think that Elgin portrays the role of fiction and poetry in understanding very accurately.
Or perhaps I'm just misunderstanding the reading.
Shifting Focus
Better Understanding
Chapter VI
I did have a concern about a few things in the reading. Elgin explains that secondary extensions can be leading, and uses the example of a sheep herder and a cowboy to illustrate the point. She explains that, "The residues of fiction thus infuse the findings of fact." While I understand what she's trying to say, some of that could be taken in a very negative context. I thought of the negative stereotypes say for "red necks." Is it true that people from the South like Nascar and are missing teeth and hate gays? Well, statistics might back some of that up, meaning that it technically is residing in fact, but to say that "Red necks hate gays" is definitely far too assumptive. In this context, just because something is ground in fact, it doesn't mean that using it as such is helpful.
The other question that arose while I was reading was with Elgin's idea that we deal with fiction in art and science all day, but it is useful to us none the less. While I agree that knowing things such as fuel economy are important for a car, and having this idea tells us a lot about what people value in a vehicle and about sales techniques, I think that deciphering the extent of the fiction gets a tad hazy. Understanding a piece of work like "The Jungle" tells us about the hardships of the industrial revolution in America, but at the same time, just how much of that work is reflective on the real world can lend credibility or take it away. An example from the sciences might be with current fMRI studies. Some psychologists have been accused of using fMRI to try and explain not just blood flow in the brain, but how blood flow can explain things like racism and sexism in humans. In this case, is the fiction really helping our understanding? I would argue that it isn't, it is in fact doing quite the opposite.
Monday, February 23, 2009
Exemplars and Features
"By making the avoidance of error our sole or primary epistemic objective, it overlooked the importance we attach to sensitivity, relevance, informativeness, and cognitive efficacy. We regularly risk error to achieve such ends." pg 59
We asked the question in class, how do we rethink knowlege?
I think that this chapter adds a layer to just how we can rethink what we know and why we know it... with new evidence and new informationcertain aspects of reality start to make more sense. This is what epistimologyis all about, or at least what I have begun to deduce from Elgin's arguments
"For in shifting its focus from knowledge to understanding, epistemologydevalues truth." pg 171
As we saw early in the last chapter on the value of emotions, and now on these exemplars which bring out certain features of beliefs, there is more to knowlege and understanding then certainty and coherent facts.Cognitive emotions shape our beliefs and the system of beliefs just asseemingly false experiments or art can be helpful to cognition if they fit in and facilitate a system of beliefs.
Exemplification is not only a mechanism for shaping our cognition, but italso provides a way of understanding and categorizing features. As Elgin described in earlier chapters, this categorization is essential to knowlege.
"Exemplification is a mode of reference, so anything that exemplifies is a symbol.Not only do experiments exemplify theoretically significant features, and works ofart formally significant features, ordinary samples and examples exemplify the featuresthey display." pg 172
These categories can also help us to better understand the world, bringing different aspects into focus and thus shaping our view of the world or even creating a new world. This goes back to the idea of world-making. Under different exemplification or different categories of signifigance, our beliefs may change. This is not necessarily sayingthat these exemplars cause our beliefs to be more or less true, but rather that they add to our understanding of reality.
This is the main point that I take away from todays reading as well as yesterday's.
The picture that Picasso paints of Gertrude Stein may not be her exact likeness, however it does not make the painting less true or less important. Some of the features it bring to focus may tell us more about Stein than a physical likeness, and this is more important than straight forward truths.
Pictures, Perceptions and the Like
However, later in the article Schwartz discusses the importance of classification and the extent to which one person's ability to notice certain aspects of a face, for example, help to create categories into which we can place other faces. The creation of categories implies that there is something from which to create categories in the first place - a reality independent of our perceptions. Schwartz thus appears to be saying that an infinite number of features exist on a face, and it is up to the perceiver to pick out the ones he or she takes to be the most important. This process eventually produces categories.
With regard to the creation of categories, I was confused by the following passages:
"This class, like any other class of objects, tenselessly always existed. It also always contained all and only the members it has, regardless of the doings of Picasso or anyone else. Indeed, the class we now take to be composed of resemblers of Stein would (if we exclude the reflexive case) have been extensionally the same class and just as real had Stein herself never existed. This, however, says no more than that classes are individuated by the members they keep" (714).
On the next page, Schwartz writes:
"The point then is not the trivial reminder that words bear arbitrary connections to their denotations and, hence, require human habits or conventions to give them their referential force...The idea of the fact of the matter, 'Stephen looking like Stein,' sitting out there or just being that way, while awaiting the good fortune to be noticed or recorded, evaporates" (715).
So categories and labels exist and have always exist but at the same time have not. Could we clarify these two passages in class?
I found the last part of Schwartz's article rather interesting. In applying his theory that by observing the world we partake in "world-making," the author contends that scientists as observers partake in world-making as well (719). This parallel between scientists and artists is interesting and novel. In my opinion, this idea merits more discussion.
Schwartz
Sunday, February 22, 2009
Pictures and Perception
I feel like maybe this reading wasn't necessarily assigned to us for us to think that the picture changes reality, like Picasso and Stein, that Picasso truly created an image that was different from Stein in reality, I think instead it was meant to show us how valuable a picture or image is.
Here are my other thoughts:
*Because pictures and images are things we can return to and they will not change, they have a large impact on us, as opposed to reality, which we cannot freeze or come back to exactly. Therefore, even if the image isn't exactly real, it can alter our thoughts
*Power of pictures :Plans in pictures help us to visualize what we will create, words can provide context, but a picture is best, especially when we are hoping to communicate our ideas to another person
*I was wondering if the bottom of page 712 was referring to looking at something with or without outside influence?
*Artists/creators have power over the interpretation of the subject he/she created, BUT the interpreter obviously has the final say/decisions/interpretation of the piece, especially if they do not get to speak with the creator; Though Picasso has control over his art, we still have control over the interpretation, and that interpretation is restricted to the interpreter's (mine/our) thoughts
The Power of Pictures
The Power of Pictures
Thursday, February 19, 2009
Emotions
Emotions
Nonetheless, what Elgin is arguing has roots in common, everyday practice and is widely accepted in society with regard to some issues. For instance, Elgin argues that emotions can sometimes act as the initial signs of a tenable belief. Women, in self-defense courses and really throughout secondary school, are constantly told that if something "feels wrong" or "feels off," then it probably is.
The extent to which intuition can inform tenable beliefs is at time remarkable. On the other hand, as Elgin readily acknowledges, emotions can also cause people to misjudge situations and grossly misconstrue how they should respond to certain events (a perfect example is Othello's overwhelming jealousy).
I appreciate that Elgin spent so much of the chapter carefully and thoroughly distinguishing between the many different types of outcomes emotions may cause. In this regard, Chapter 5 is epistemically and practically useful.
Chapter 5
Emotional Intelligence
An Emotive Epistemology?
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
Norms and Rules
Elgin and Wittgenstein (based on my understanding of the read, at least) both acknowledge this the extent to which RULES do not fully govern games. My question pertains to how informal norms or rules influence the outcome of the inquiry. If knowledge, the result of the game or inquiry, is the outcome of a set of a rules that produced it but are subject to exceptions at any time, is such knowledge valid?
Elgin chapter 4
Equilibrium and Understanding
One thing with which I struggled to find a balance was the discussion she had about using imperfect procedural epistemology as a means to go higher. She basically had a "no pain, no gain" approach to scientific exploration and creating permanent tenability when she described the process on 127. I follow her point entirely at this juncture, as no greater good has ever been created by sticking to safe assumptions in regard to new evidence and detail. Indeed, risking being horrifically wrong in front of your scientific peers is a necessary evil of research. However, later on she describes the danger of pushing a system until it unravels can also result in having to completely redo the entire body of work. Sometimes pushing a system results in greater conformation of the understanding, sometimes it destroys it. Although I do agree that we should definitely in principle always push for a greater understanding and test the boundaries of what we assume to be correct, it calls into question the issue of practicality. I suppose using what information we have due to preliminary testing and using that to build to other levels of understanding is the best we can hope for, but the level at which we can say we're sure enough is a harder call. Although it is also the case the information gained on shaky grounds can also serve to back up or refute earlier info as well, since earlier inquiries being off doesn't necessarily mean other inquiries are also off. But then again, no pain, no gain.
Monday, February 16, 2009
My quest for tenability
So there I was, I had finished the reading, and I got it. Then, I thought to myself, "You know, Elgin used the word 'tenable' in like every other sentence, and I don't really know what it means. I should look it up." I was assuming it meant something like "plausible" or "logical." Turns out it means "capable of being held, maintained, or defended." I don't think the difference between the two definitions is insignificant. There's a difference (I think) between the ability to come to a conclusion and the ability to then maintain that conclusion--they're two separate steps in the conclusion-having process.
Now I don't know what to think. Does this shatter my fragile understanding of the concept? (which is kind of ironic--this kind of illustrates the accepting of an initially tenable idea and switching) Does the difference in what "tenable" means matter enough?
A Whole New World
With regard to the article, I fumbled through it and felt as though I had a shaky understanding of it until this part: "Mere acknowledgement of the many available frames of reference provides us with no map of the motions of heavenly bodies: acceptance of the eligibility of alternative bases produces no scientific theory or philosophical system; awareness of the varied ways of seeing paints no pictures. A broad mind is no substitute for hard work" (71).
Wasn't that the point of Goodman's article though? As I understand it, Goodman spent most of the piece exploring the interrelations between various worlds as well as things like deletions, etc, which, in my mind, rests on the assumption that we should be open to different worlds. Was this not the point of Goodman's refutation of reductionism?
If we could spent some time in class fleshing out a clear and cohesive thesis, I think that that would be enormously helpful with regard to understanding the rest of the article.
Goodman
Sunday, February 15, 2009
There Can only be One
Quickly Matt McGuire will say Garnett. Why? because the Celtics won the championship, and in the system of the NBA there is only one champion. Goodman will say that Mcguire would weigh and order his information relating to the picture and be able to choose one. Goodman would also say that Mcguire is right. Mcguire is right because both sides accept that the championship decides the victor, and prior to the game they may have a dichotomy since both players thinks they will be the champion, but after the conclusion is not contested. Now look at the examples below:
Each Person may be able to come up with different results. All of these pictures give us so much information but when we answer the questions of who is the "one" we use different systems to answer the question. The TV world, Sports World, and Political world show how we make these systems of measurements that are relative to what we are measuring. For all of these (before elections) according to Goodman, their would be no Truth, for now based on different systems each one could be the one since each half has its own precepts for why they are the "true one". Bryant thinks that the best player is the one who takes his team to more championships, Jordan thinks it is about career points. Both can be correct but since their is differing precepts not believed by the other, their can be no true result. However Goodman states that we cannot just reduce to believe only what is true because it would be to little, but we cannot believe everything because that would be too vast.
The Last example that I wish to show is one example in which such a poster cannot frame. While the NBA finals were going on avid NBA fan Matt fit in his puzzle of knowledge as a placeholder a piece that said either Celtics or lakers will be the NBA champions. Since their was no answer yet, he could not accept it at fact just a theory. In the same way we notice that when people have inconclusive evidence and two theories they adapt one as a placeholder and until further exploration. The world is flat or round? at one time their was a debate but now it is widely excepted by scientific verification what the answer is, and now we all know what is true. In a current context we can look at global warming. If you look at fox news they bring on two guests when talking about global warming; one for and one against. This establishes that their is a difference, and that two scientists can reach differ ant results. This is what I consider a false dichotomy. Since both rely on scientific verification as their reasoning only one can be right. Some of these "scientists" are payed by Exxon Mobil or large corporations and are even payed to be perverse to Global Warming, in 1987 when Global warming was first released in a scientific study as being true, the U.S. government censored much of the terminology that made global warming a concrete stolid occurrence that is a problem. In conclusion the goal was to create a debate, because when their is a debate that means their is no accepted truth.
Goodman Article
This section of Goodman's article summarizes, in a way, a thought I've had throughout this course. This may seem a bit basic and perhaps obvious, but in debating the definition of truth and knowledge, I cannot seem to get past the point that each individual is hampered by his or her own reality and knowledge. The human mind is limited simply by what it knows. Whether true or not, an individual's beliefs are formed based upon the knowledge the individual has at that certain point in time. While this is not a concrete or infallible funtion, it seems to be a limitation with which we all must contend. Goodman seems to assert, in this small passage, that the average person's reality is not defined by the philosophers or even simply another passerby; instead, the average person defines his own reality. Whether it is true or not seems almost irrelevant because he believes it is. For example, if you were to tell a new mother that her physical stress levels have not risen since the birth of her child, yet she believes herself to be more stressed than she was previously, it will be inconsequential. It won't necessarily change the way she feels, nor her outlook on the world.
So it seems with more intangible beliefs. Morality, ethics, and feelings are impossible to prove but can become an individual's reality (or at least play a crucial role). Thus, habit and and individual's ability to process thought and knowledge create his or her world.
Goodman article, and Elgin
Paths to Knowledge
15 February 2009
The World: Absolutely Relative
Nelson Goodman discusses the “world” as a convention of humankind. The “actual” world, or the world-as-such, is ineffable. We, as humans, have as a part of our existence the need to create and sustain the “worlds” we live in, and given the pluralism that exists in our “worlds” and the effects of technology on our abilities to encounter and communicate with people that live “worlds apart”, it can be difficult to negotiate the crumbling terrain of being in a “world.”
What Goodman does in his essay Words, Works, and Worlds, is cast a soft light on this reality. We needn’t have a panic attack given the ineffability of the world-as-such; rather, we ought to recognize that what is considered the “world” by ourselves may not be the case for others. Given this understanding, we can explore our “world” and the “worlds” of others as we journey through life.
But what are we to take as a good world to live in? Is there epistemic continuity between worlds? Well, there must be, for one strong fundamental commonality of world-making and world-inhabitance is the human capacity and apparent need for language, wherein resides the possibility for epistemic continuity. Language is rule-governed. While it is possible to redefine the parameters of language, we most often seem to use language to communicate with one another, and given this aim of language, it doesn’t make a lot of sense to do this. Given this, we flourish by playing by the rules of language, i.e., reason, and correspondingly, logic.
With language as our medium of epistemic continuity between worlds, we can discern the good life by understanding our own world and the worlds of others. Whether we are right about our mode of inhabiting the good life is unknowable absolutely, but is knowable contingently. This is where I see some of Elgin’s work coming in to play. Perfect Procedural Epistemology would say that we ought to maintain skepticism about our world and the worlds of others because the truth of our ideas about reality are absolutely uncertain, and therefore, to avoid error, we remain in ignorance.
If we inhabit the world through the Perfect Procedural Epistemological lens, we indeed do become downtrodden and skeptical about the whole endeavor of life; which is why we may have much to gain by considering life through the lens of Imperfect Procedural Epistemology. In inhabiting a pattern of thought and action governed by Imperfect Procedural Epistemology we can consider opposing views of reality with a bit of a grain of salt, and still maintain a rigorous pursuit of knowledge and truth. In doing so, we have the possibility of learning from one another about the common experience called Life, and experiencing a richer world of our own.
mondays article
Saturday, February 14, 2009
Friday, February 13, 2009
justified knowledge
Thursday, February 12, 2009
KNOWledge...how can you have it without KNOWING something?
Structural Problems in Foundationalism
Foundationalism and Games
Although I liked the analogy of the game that Elgin uses throughout the beginning of the 3rd chapter, I was disheartened by one part of the analogy. Elgin describes one of the aspects of the game as playing to determine who is the better player of the game, not who is the better person. This is, of course, the reason we decide that "may the better person win" before we play a game, with the hope that the one with the most skill and abilities comes out on top. However, this isn't always the case, and sometimes we get a ball that takes a bad hop or keep getting lousy hands. If this is the case, we hope winners and losers will come out in the wash, but saying this seems to be a problem with the procedure if applied to truth. Elgin explained in chapter 2 that it is often the one who has the most convincing argument who wins, not the one who is defending the actual truth. In this case, the analogy seems to contradict her earlier statement (although it is possible that the analogy just works in most cases.)
The overlapping of "isms"
The Truth and Gambling
In light of the example of gambling I have a hard time believe this last quotation. In gambling an individual (one that is good at gambling) plays the odds in a uniform process. Whether it is counting cards, keeping track of which hands have been played, using calculations based on his hand compared to what other players hands are, doing research on a race house or basketball team; either way, it seems to me that this person could be justified to epistemic entitlement or in other words confidence.
One could say life decisions are gambles as well because he don't know if our beliefs by which we make decisions are true ones or false ones. We do the best with what we find to be reasonable justifiable and make decisions. Are we not to make any decisions in life with a feeling of confidence.
Kevin Kuhle
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
Chapter 3
For Wittgenstein and the others (but especially Wittgenstein), reality must necessarily be socially constucted. Truth is irrelevant, some unreachable ideal, and knowledge is only a (the?) prevailing opinion. What seems indubitable to one paradigm is lunacy and delusion to the paradigm that succeeds it. I cannot say much about Rorty, but I have read a little Wittgenstein and am currently reading Kuhn, and take the latter differently than Elgin, but not in any way that I can articulate at the moment. Hopefully as we get deeper in I will be able to formulate a more intelligent response with more cognitive consistency!
well that section will need some explaining in class
Pure Proceduralism- The rules will bring about the conclusion that is correct thus if we know the rules and follow them to their conclusion then we will know the truth. The problem is that the set of rules are socially established and gain authority from being accepted by the community rather than having some connection to reality.
For Wittgenstien he tries to explain pure proceduralism with his analogy of a game. In the end we are basing our inquiry on a set of rules chosen through agreement because we like them, nothing more. Kuhn I think gets stuck in a problem of arguing that the only problems that can be solved are the ones that we have set for yourselves within the guidelines of the method we have created. If I understand this at a level that is even close to accurately then I think what is being argued here is that we have found methods which we claim give us truth and try to show that by setting problems which can be solved through the method and then accepting this as proof. So here our justification is that we can apply what we have come to claim as knowledge within a field, thus counting it as true. But this does not really work because the knowledge is not really about reality just about the system we have created. Thus knowledge here is not knowledge it is just the agreed upon correct use of a theory within a system. I don't know if that is actually close to right at all.
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
Ch1 and 2
Since this book is a little bit dense, at this point I'm mostly concerned with picking out the key ideas. Thus far, I believe the author will be arguing that the "middle ground," so to say, imperfect procedural epistemology, is favorable to the other two that she describes (perfect and pure). This is because, according to the author, perfect procedural knowledge has too stringent of a standard with regard to what is and not is not considered true. In Chapter 1, for example, the author points out that analogy, metaphor, and comparable devices are not, under the category of perfect procedural epistemology, considered relevant or "true." Thus, Elgin is partially doing what Lynch did: taking a "middle ground." However, Elgin does so in a vastly different way.
Mostly Ch. 1
Monday, February 9, 2009
Types of Epistemology - Not Touching Chapter 2 Yet
If the choice is between never being wrong and being wrong while looking for something more, it almost makes perfect epistemology look cowardly. Pure epistemology was almost moving into the realm of pluralism, but Elgin instead explains that pure epistemology is true within the context of the environmental structure, so it lends itself instead to be relativism. Lynch would say that relativism is a simple-minded waste of time, but being a product of a procedure seems to fit the explanation closely. Only being able to dispute practices that fit within the mechanisms, although it is explained as a pure epistemology, it seems to align more with perfect epistemology. It seems this way since it’s only willing to take on certain truths, and since perfect epistemology only deals with what can be absolutely true, the two seem related in theory. Perhaps it’s the limited scope of these two theories that caused Elgin to want to elaborate on imperfect epistemology for her book.
The first of these three does not sound appealing to me at all but the other two I can see a use in. I guess the imperfect epistemology is what I am more inclined to lean towards because of the class moral truth. It did a great job of convincing me that we hold beliefs when they cohere and we have justification for them but must also accept the fact that any one of our beliefs or all of them could be wrong. This seemed best because then I am not stuck with any beliefs that I hold as a priori facts(they make me uneasy). In this chapter there was something about coherence not being enough, that we must be able to balance everything. I am not sure I completely understand this idea and would love to talk about it more in class. I feel like the argument is just that we need to know how to balance our justification for beliefs in order to have the best reason for believing it and thus being closer to correct. But this is probably a much simpler understanding than he was going for.
Elgin 1/2
Perfect procedural epistemology is, from my personal ideological perspective, the most appealing. It has the most stringent requirements for truth, yet is so naive to think itself infallible. I am drawn to its mathematical/logical approach, but since any error is unthinkable(according to Elgin) it ends up dogmatizing, and any error that does result from this process becomes entrenched.
The appealing aspects of imperfect procedural epistemology are its ability to answer difficult questions, and more importantly, the admitted fallibility of the process. Any sort of knowledge obtained through this process is only tentatively believed, and the believer is willing to abandon any belief once a better one presents itself. If only there were some middle way between perfect and imperfect epistemologies!
I do not find pure procedural epistemology particularly appealing, but I do find it necessary. We often come across technological devices we do not fully understand and places we are not familiar with, so we must rely on a manual or set of directions to operate independently. We have faith in the procedure itself, and when it does not produce the expected results, the actor generally assumes that he/she somehow screwed up the procedure.
Sunday, February 8, 2009
Computers Cannot be Wrong
From the reading it struck me odd that they didn't make the claim that I am about to make.
Some say that if I have a calculator and ask it 2+2 it will say 4 and we will say it's right, but if it states 3 then some say it is wrong. I feel like this point justifies the claims made by the two authors. To compare we can ask ourselves if we hop on the 3'clock train to Minnesota, are we expecting it to go in Texas? No, because the tracks are made so that when we hop on the train the system will do what we planned it to do. In the same way, if we look into a mirror, can we say the mirror is wrong?
So another person will say, well then how can a human be wrong. They know the system of addition and substraction? To answer this I can also say that in the same way a computer can't be wrong, a Nueron can't be wrong. If you remember in psychology the biological stimulas known as action potential has close resemblencies to a computer. A Neuron will either fire or not fire based on if it is triggered. so where is the casual properties? The choice of what is triggered or not is built upon our experiences. It is the reason why we say 2+2 = 4 (mathametical) and not two plus two equals twotwo (linguistic?). For example, their was an instance in which a harvard graduate had a problem in her brain in which one hemisphere became deffective. Her neurons were now transmitting in differant ways. She stated that she felt "free" and saw things in differant ways, and started to preach about nirvana afterwords. She was seeing the same things she was before but her perception changed becouse her brain was relaying information in a differant way.
So if we were to say a human is wrong, it would mean that some nueral connections were triggered that led to the wrong end based on what neural network was stronger at the time. For example I may think that the stimulas package is not actually beneficial, but more of a statment to infuse confidence. That is becouse my experiences in politics, history, and economics outweigh my acceptance of basic rhetoric. However the key point remains; I may be wrong.
If a computer had part of it's "brain" altered, basically we would see an error becouse unless someone difines where it's tracks are headed it won't be able to reach a destination. If computers could answer everything, it could answer what it didn't know, and their would be no need for software support. Viruses try to destroy the "answers" in a program and when you see an error, lots of times you will see: "_____ _____ exception fault", meaning their is an exception to the rules that are in place and I have no idea what to do so I'm showing you this screen so you can tell someone to tell me what to do.
A computer cannot be wrong by the mere fact that a nueron can't be wrong. It may lead to a conclusion that we feel isn't true, but if the program remains the same it will never change it's answer.
Saturday, February 7, 2009
Lynch, pt.2
Paths to Knowledge
7 February 2009
Truth and Happiness
Lynch takes time in part III of True To Life to discuss a very personal reason we ought to care about truth: “…caring about truth is deeply connected to happiness.” How is this so? Lynch says that truth is connected to happiness because one can only live a happy, flourishing life if one lives with both integrity and authenticity, both of which are contingent upon truth. Let’s look more closely at these connections.
If truth is connected to happiness via a life lived with integrity and authenticity, then what is an authentic life? What is a life lived with integrity? Before analyzing the connections Lynch makes, I would like to consider these terms myself.
When I think of an authentic life, I immediately think of Martin Heidegger, given the amount of time I’ve spent studying his work. For Heidegger (very, very roughly speaking), an authentic life is one where Dasein (German for “there-being”) lives to its ownmost potential. The possibility of Dasein living to its ownmost potential consists of both recognizing the parameters within which Dasein has its life (radical finitude), and living concernfully with others in light of these parameters.
Now, let’s look at how Lynch makes the case, and see if there are points of connectivity. To begin, Lynch says that for an authentic life to be possible, we must follow the Oracle of Delphi’s charge to Socrates, to “know thyself.” Why is this the case? Knowing thyself means that we know the truth about ourselves, and when we know what the truth about ourselves is, we can see where we fall short and where we thrive. Without the truth component, we couldn’t distinguish right from wrong, or measure successes and failures. Without being able to distinguish right from wrong or being able to measure successes and failures, how could we possibly live authentically?
Lynch’s authenticity and Heidegger’s authenticity indeed seem to have points of connection. First, Lynch requires knowledge of the self, and Heidegger indeed does also, although their conceptions differ. Heidegger’s knowledge of the self (again, roughly speaking) consists in recognition of our imminent end (death), and living futurally in light of our past. Lynch’s knowledge of the self consists in knowing what is true about the self. At first glance, Lynch’s conception seems more nuanced than Heidegger’s, though for any of us who have studied Heidegger, we know that Heidegger is quite nuanced, and more often than not, what seems quite comprehensible at first often requires further looking.
For Lynch, knowledge of the self consists in knowing what is true about the self. So I can say that it is true that I am a male, that I have certain propensities and aversions, and that I go to Drake University. Apophatically, I can also say that it is not the case that I am a female, nor is it the case that I go to Iowa State University. More deeply, I know that I am agnostic, that I value in particular ways that are truth-functionally inconsistent with the paradigms of some of those I love deeply, yet truth-functionally consistent with my own conception of my paradigm (I will not try to name or make explicit my conception of my paradigm at this time).
For me to live authentically in a Lynchean sense would be to come to better understand my paradigm, and within those parameters discern where I conduct myself in truth-consistent manners and where I fail to do so. Having this understanding will provide me with justifiable criteria to know when I’m right or wrong in most cases, and therefore I can discern if I am living authentically or not.
Let’s now look at Heidegger’s authenticity, given its sway in my thinking at this point in my life. For one to live authentically in a Heideggerian sense is to live in the world with concern for overcoming oneself. We concern ourselves with various problems that need understanding or overcoming, and it is in these moments of understanding that the world opens up to us, or truth is unconcealed.
This is much different language than Lynch’s to talk about truth and authenticity, but I see connections. For a Heideggerian to experience truth in terms of Lynch, she would recognize a problem in her world of possibilities (have concern; and for such a problem to be recognized there must be an existing truth norm), and succeed in aligning herself with a truth-consistent mode of thought/conduct, and in the successful alignment she would be truth-consistent in both paradigms of thought.
Okay, I’m going to desist at this point, as this post is getting too long, and I’m getting into some pretty technical language which is better-suited for a paper. To close, my point is that I saw a lot of contiguity between my understanding of authenticity and Lynch’s understanding of authenticity, though I think that at more length and with more precision we would begin to diverge.
Thursday, February 5, 2009
sad to see truth go?
But I really appreciated Lynch's final chapters despite the fact that they were not full of new "ism's" and were not necessarily debunking other philosophies, much like the previous chapters. I liked these because they seemed very practical. Like we discussed in class today, Lynch wrote this book for the non-philosopher, and I think he is able to defend his truisms best with the final chapters on happiness, lying and democracy. Because he is able to relate his truisms to things we experience on a daily basis.
The most interesting thing about this book for me is that in beginning it, I was almost afraid because I felt I could no longer believe in what I thought was true, when in fact, the end of the book made me feel much more confident in my feelings of truth.
Lies and Damned Lies
I don't agree with Kant that there is never a good time to lie, indeed if it's the matter of saving someone's life the answer is clear to me, and in turn I feel that this kind of lie can add to someone's integrity. Here's what I mean: Say I'm hiding out at my friend Jessica's house, and I hear wind that someone is coming for me. If she hides me and lies to the kidnappers about my being there, she has technically told a lie to them. However, it adds to her own integrity because the lie she told wasn't to hoard power over the kidnappers, it was to ensure my own unalienable rights, such as the one to life. In addition, her own integrity can get a little boost due to the fact that she is trustworthy with not only the truth about me, but when it's more important to sacrifice her own morals about lying for a friend's rights.
Lynch is sure to emphasize the power of intention early on, and it's something with which I truly agree. The same result can come as a consequence of differing intentions, but since it won't always be the case, having moral truths to guide your actions is the best policy. In the end, if everyone does what they feel is right by maintaining their moral integrity in their actions, the good will come out in the wash.
Are We Orwellian?
It seems that for us to avoid a Orwellian situation like he had stated in chapter 10, we must have more than just the authority as a source on what is happening. This is usually the invisible hand which is considered the media. In the Vietnam war, reporters were trying to get the truth and finding out as much information as they possible can. They were skeptical, they were full of inquiry and they didn't falter in going against popular opinion. However in the Iraq war we see a different story. Reporters were embedded into the army units which made them feel like they were a part of the team, it enhanced the US vs. Them mentality. Furthermore the U.S. didn't allow press that they had pre-filtered to being hostile toward the inititive. Their was many problems that resulted, one of which was deception.
Lynch is right that we must individually strive to find out what is true, but it becomes very hard to do when avenues of information are being tainted to fit one viewpoint. The public oppinion test also fails when the path of destruction laid down is as extensive as it were. From the rendition and illegal torture of terror suspects, to the pre-emptive take over, when not equipped with the instrument in which to find truth, there is no grounds in which liberalism can flourish and have an goverment represent them accuratly.
Last Chapters...
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
Lynch 8/9/10
One point that I must disagree with Lynch on, however, is his point that an attitude directed towards the pursuit of truth is requisite for a liberal democracy. I argue that such an attitude would in fact impede democracy; voters vote not for those that speak the truth, but for those who have convinced them most passionately. Even if a candidate holds good intentions, his/her speaking the truth will likely offend people and their carefully constructed notion of reality, and thus must withhold some truths. If politicians were somehow incapable of lying, their careers would not only be ruined, but the government would either dissolve or become a dictatorship, because the constituents would find no candidate worth voting for!
Rant over!
A helpful passage
Finally! A chapter I understand!
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
Moral Truth
I think we decided that Lynch's definition of truth is that it "matches up with reality" and then we looked at the different "ism's" he presented and related them back to his reality belief. I also have written down that, "truth is independent of believer/believing," which we decided was pretty important too. Also for your "yellow" question, I'm thinking that is similar to the example of the marker being true in class today, the reason we can't define it is because "yellow" just isn't a concept like truth or knowledge. Granted, we could define it, according to dictionary.com.
Yellow: a color like that of egg yolk, ripe lemons, etc.; the primary color between green and orange in the visible spectrum, an effect of light with a wavelength between 570 and 590 nm.
As for the rest of our discussion today, I think I am a fan of verificationism, at least for right now, because I am someone, like most, who enjoys being correct, but not just for the sake of being right, but for actually being right. If that makes any sense.
Also, regarding moral truth, I do not think that there is a definite, objective moral truth, like the obejctive truth because morality is subjective in my view. I wouldn't be opposed to hearing others' views on this because I feel that an objective moral truth is possible, but right now I can't figure out how to prove that.
This probably makes no sense
Also, have we as a class come up with the definition of truth that Lynch has been using? Did I miss that?
Verificationism
On the flip side of that, there are still beliefs that I hold that can't be proven by any scientific means. I am not religious, but I am spiritual and I belief, somewhat, in a higher power. D i have scientific proof of this? No. But do i have good reasons for believing this? Yes. This is why I could never be a pragmatist. Believing in spirituality is not necessarily corresponding to any type of reality, but it does make me feel good sometimes. I'm getting more and more interested to hear about what Lynch's ultimate opinion is on truth and to see where exactly he is going as he debunks (or critiques) all of these theories on truth.
Moral truth?
Scientific Truth
Monday, February 2, 2009
Tackling the Unanalyzable
Perhaps the fact that we know of “good” and “bad” things and place value upon them is because we actually do have an intrinsic cognitive reason for doing so. Lynch criticized Moore for saying that good is unanalyzable, but the fact that we are aware of it means that it had to have come from somewhere in our minds. Perhaps it is possible to approach this scientifically. Since we today are aware of “good” things, and value truth as one of those good things, maybe it means that we have encoded, through millions of years of evolution, to have a correlation to “goodness” with other adjectives such as “yellow” or “warm.” It might be the case that as human beings, we cognitively strive for what is good and truth falls into the category of what is good. Although we’re not always motivated to strive for this at all times of our waking day, we have a frontal lobe that allows us to make deep, rational decisions about “good” and “bad” things. Clearly, someone somewhere had to be the first human who had thoughts about what was really the truth and what was really good, so this search has become evolutionarily important to our survival. Even though we don’t always do what we think we should do, we should still pursue the truth, and to do so, we need to be able to recognize it. To say things like love and kindness don’t exist due to their lacking testability is selling our brains very short.
Ch. 6/7
not related to the reading but still interesting
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20126911.300-our-world-may-be-a-giant-hologram.html?page=1
Chaps 6/7
The section about Nietzsche really intrigued me. To me it raises a question Lynch has yet to answer: is it more important to know the truth, or is it more important to be able to prove (enforce?) the "truth"? An example: you are hiring someone to build you a house, and must make a decision between two contractors. One has lots of experience building houses (good ones!), but has no knowledge of physics or structural engineering and could not tell you why the foundation must be built a certain way or why the trusses must be angled so; the other holds a doctorate in engineering and can explain what materials should be used to structural integrity and do so with complex formulae, but has not actually built a house before. Which one would you hire?