The Pitfalls of Absolute Certainty

This was a particularly interesting chapter because it tied into what we read at the beginning of the semester - namely, that absolute certainty may not necessarily be a good goal for knowledge and understanding. According to the authors, authors such as Adelard rejected curiosity and some forms of wonder (ones that were not regularized with nature) as belonging to the domain of the ignorant or the superstitious. This is in stark contrast to the wonders of early and late Medieval courts.

A lot of what we read in Elgin and Lynch was theoretical (well, to an extent), and so I enjoyed this chapter because it shows what can happen, historically, when absolute certainty is put at the forefront or when knowledge is consigned to the domain of God. It led to misinterpretations of Aristotle's works and a sad intellectual decay.

I do wonder though - why the emphasis on Aristotle? One of the main arguments put forth in this chapter is that early Medieval thinkers misinterpreted his works - is this necessarily a bad thing? Must thinkers stick to Aristotle as though his works are orthodoxy? Is there perhaps not a better argument against the sort of practices adopted by Adelard and company?