Ch1 and 2

I'm not entirely sure that I understand Chapters 1 and 2 (in fact, all), but one of the things that struck me in Chapter 1 was an article we read by Gettier earlier in the semester. According to the Gettier problem, justified true beliefs can be based on faulty knowledge, even if theoretically this is not supposed to happen. Since perfect procedural epistemology takes as true knowledge based on other knowledge, is it not possible that justified true beliefs can be based on faulty knowledge and thus run into the Gettier problem? If so, then perfect procedural epistemology may well be problematic (which is, what I think, the author is arguing in Chapter 2 in a more general sense).

Since this book is a little bit dense, at this point I'm mostly concerned with picking out the key ideas. Thus far, I believe the author will be arguing that the "middle ground," so to say, imperfect procedural epistemology, is favorable to the other two that she describes (perfect and pure). This is because, according to the author, perfect procedural knowledge has too stringent of a standard with regard to what is and not is not considered true. In Chapter 1, for example, the author points out that analogy, metaphor, and comparable devices are not, under the category of perfect procedural epistemology, considered relevant or "true." Thus, Elgin is partially doing what Lynch did: taking a "middle ground." However, Elgin does so in a vastly different way.