Lynch, pt.2

Blake Daniel Brown
Paths to Knowledge
7 February 2009

Truth and Happiness

Lynch takes time in part III of True To Life to discuss a very personal reason we ought to care about truth: “…caring about truth is deeply connected to happiness.” How is this so? Lynch says that truth is connected to happiness because one can only live a happy, flourishing life if one lives with both integrity and authenticity, both of which are contingent upon truth. Let’s look more closely at these connections.
If truth is connected to happiness via a life lived with integrity and authenticity, then what is an authentic life? What is a life lived with integrity? Before analyzing the connections Lynch makes, I would like to consider these terms myself.
When I think of an authentic life, I immediately think of Martin Heidegger, given the amount of time I’ve spent studying his work. For Heidegger (very, very roughly speaking), an authentic life is one where Dasein (German for “there-being”) lives to its ownmost potential. The possibility of Dasein living to its ownmost potential consists of both recognizing the parameters within which Dasein has its life (radical finitude), and living concernfully with others in light of these parameters.
Now, let’s look at how Lynch makes the case, and see if there are points of connectivity. To begin, Lynch says that for an authentic life to be possible, we must follow the Oracle of Delphi’s charge to Socrates, to “know thyself.” Why is this the case? Knowing thyself means that we know the truth about ourselves, and when we know what the truth about ourselves is, we can see where we fall short and where we thrive. Without the truth component, we couldn’t distinguish right from wrong, or measure successes and failures. Without being able to distinguish right from wrong or being able to measure successes and failures, how could we possibly live authentically?
Lynch’s authenticity and Heidegger’s authenticity indeed seem to have points of connection. First, Lynch requires knowledge of the self, and Heidegger indeed does also, although their conceptions differ. Heidegger’s knowledge of the self (again, roughly speaking) consists in recognition of our imminent end (death), and living futurally in light of our past. Lynch’s knowledge of the self consists in knowing what is true about the self. At first glance, Lynch’s conception seems more nuanced than Heidegger’s, though for any of us who have studied Heidegger, we know that Heidegger is quite nuanced, and more often than not, what seems quite comprehensible at first often requires further looking.
For Lynch, knowledge of the self consists in knowing what is true about the self. So I can say that it is true that I am a male, that I have certain propensities and aversions, and that I go to Drake University. Apophatically, I can also say that it is not the case that I am a female, nor is it the case that I go to Iowa State University. More deeply, I know that I am agnostic, that I value in particular ways that are truth-functionally inconsistent with the paradigms of some of those I love deeply, yet truth-functionally consistent with my own conception of my paradigm (I will not try to name or make explicit my conception of my paradigm at this time).
For me to live authentically in a Lynchean sense would be to come to better understand my paradigm, and within those parameters discern where I conduct myself in truth-consistent manners and where I fail to do so. Having this understanding will provide me with justifiable criteria to know when I’m right or wrong in most cases, and therefore I can discern if I am living authentically or not.
Let’s now look at Heidegger’s authenticity, given its sway in my thinking at this point in my life. For one to live authentically in a Heideggerian sense is to live in the world with concern for overcoming oneself. We concern ourselves with various problems that need understanding or overcoming, and it is in these moments of understanding that the world opens up to us, or truth is unconcealed.
This is much different language than Lynch’s to talk about truth and authenticity, but I see connections. For a Heideggerian to experience truth in terms of Lynch, she would recognize a problem in her world of possibilities (have concern; and for such a problem to be recognized there must be an existing truth norm), and succeed in aligning herself with a truth-consistent mode of thought/conduct, and in the successful alignment she would be truth-consistent in both paradigms of thought.
Okay, I’m going to desist at this point, as this post is getting too long, and I’m getting into some pretty technical language which is better-suited for a paper. To close, my point is that I saw a lot of contiguity between my understanding of authenticity and Lynch’s understanding of authenticity, though I think that at more length and with more precision we would begin to diverge.