Emotions

The idea that Elgin presents in Chapter 5, that emotions may yield the first signs of a LATER tenable thought, is rather interesting to me. Since, as Elgin mentioned, there is usually a mutual exclusivity that is assigned to "reason" and "emotions," I had never fully realized the extent to which emotions inform classification, categories, reclassification, and so forth.

Nonetheless, what Elgin is arguing has roots in common, everyday practice and is widely accepted in society with regard to some issues. For instance, Elgin argues that emotions can sometimes act as the initial signs of a tenable belief. Women, in self-defense courses and really throughout secondary school, are constantly told that if something "feels wrong" or "feels off," then it probably is.

The extent to which intuition can inform tenable beliefs is at time remarkable. On the other hand, as Elgin readily acknowledges, emotions can also cause people to misjudge situations and grossly misconstrue how they should respond to certain events (a perfect example is Othello's overwhelming jealousy).

I appreciate that Elgin spent so much of the chapter carefully and thoroughly distinguishing between the many different types of outcomes emotions may cause. In this regard, Chapter 5 is epistemically and practically useful.