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In Chapter 3, Elgin makes an important distinction between rules and accepted norms in her discussion of inquiry as a social practice with regard to Wittgenstein's theory of inquiry as game. Games, after all, have strict rules and then certain unspoken or accepted norms which may be followed. For instance, in hockey it is not written into the rules that players should or can fight in certain leagues (although in the NHL I think they are allowed to). Nevertheless, when a fight breaks out between hockey players rarely if ever is there a timely intervention. Elgin cites another example in Chapter 3 (that of grammatical rules and how they are sometimes broken in favor of accepted mistakes.
Elgin and Wittgenstein (based on my understanding of the read, at least) both acknowledge this the extent to which RULES do not fully govern games. My question pertains to how informal norms or rules influence the outcome of the inquiry. If knowledge, the result of the game or inquiry, is the outcome of a set of a rules that produced it but are subject to exceptions at any time, is such knowledge valid?
Mental Models of Purpose of College
2 years ago
I think the way Elgin handles your question is as follows: she distinguishes that within a pure procedural epistemology, the procedure, or game playing itself expresses what the rules are. We kind of don't know what the rules actually are until we see the players playing the game. So although in football we have the rule that crossing into the endzone is equivalent to 6 points, without the actual event the rule has no application, or reality. This seems somewhat confusing, but I think it is close.
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